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To deter a nuclear attack against this country and its allies, the United 
States maintains a strategic force of land-based missiles (ICBMs), 
submarine-based missiles (SLBMs), and bombers. The bomber leg of this 
"triad" primarily consists of about 343 B-52 bombers operated by the 
Strategic Air Command (SAC). Many believe that by 1990, the B-52's 
vulnerability to improving Soviet air defenses will imperil its effectiveness 
as a penetrating bomber. There is strong sentiment in Congress and in the 
Department of Defense to replace the B-52s before that time. 
The FY81 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 96-342) directed the Secretary of 
Defense to develop a "multi-role bomber" for initial deployment by 1987. 
Candidate aircraft were to include the B-1, a derivative of the B-1, the 
FB-111B/C, and an advanced technology aircraft, which would incorporate 
"Stealth.'' Months before the choice of aircraft was announced, the new 
Reagan Administration added $2.4 billion to the FY82 defense budget, to 
initiate a bomber procurement and research and development program called 
Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA). 
In a long-awaited announcement on Oct. 2, 1981, President Reagan 
designated a modified B-1 -- also known as the B-1B -- as the aircraft to be 
built for LRCA. This decision reverses the policy of the Carter 
Administration, which was to forego the B-1, initially in favor of 
Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), and then, during the 1980 campaign, in 
favor of a "Stealthw bomber in the future. 
The Congress had a specific role in approving or disapproving President 
Reagan's decision: the bill that authorized funding for LRCA (S. 815, the 
FY82 Defense Authorization bill) provided that money could not be obligated 
for the B-1 until Nov. 18, 1981. If both Houses had agreed to resolutions sf 
disapproval before that date, LRCA funding would have been blocked. 
Opposition to the B-1 centers around support for an Advanced Technology 
Bomber (ATB) incorporating llStealth'l technologies more completely than the 
modified B-1, and offering greater potential as a penetrating bomber over the 
long term. However, the Reagan decision includes continued development of an 
ATB "for the 1990sIW leaving as primary issues the questions of affordability 
and the need for both elements of the "two-bomber" program. Even though the 
funding questions for 1982 specifically have been resolved, these issues will 
continue to underlie future debate over B-1 costs and its priority in 
successive defense budgets. 
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EXPLANATION OF TERMS 
The following distinctions in terminology used in this issue brief may be 
helpful : 
Multi-Role Bomber (MRB) -- This term was used in P.L. 96-342. The Act 
authorized $300 million for development of a multi-role bomber, and the 
resulting Air Force R&D program in FY81 bore the same title. That 
identification does not appear in the FY82 budget, however, having been 
replaced by LRCA. 
Long-Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA) -- Conceptually, MRB and LRCA envision 
an aircraft to perform the same range of conventional and strategic missions. 
The Air Force prefers the latter term, and the Reagan Administration's FY82 
budget request includes both procurement and R&D for the next bomber under 
this term. Rockwell International has used the term synonymously with their 
B-1, even before their candidate had definitely been chosen for the LRCA 
program. 
B-1 -- Rockwell International's LRCA variant of the B-1 has basically the 
same design as the earlier aircraft whose production was halted in 1977. B-1 
herein refers to an aircraft of that basic design in any configuration being 
considered today, recognizing that important questions may remain over what 
configuration to choose. While the House Armed Services Committee has 
recommended a design with minimal changes, any B-1 derivative that meets the 
criterion for timely deployment is authorized as a B-1, according to the 
House version of S. 815, the DOD Authorization bill. 
Stealth -- Highly classifies defense research projects have led to a 
technological advance formally announced on Aug. 22, 1980, called Stealth. 
Advances reportedly have application to aircraft design, materials and 
electronics, with the objective of drastically reducing the detectability of 
future aircraft, manned and unmanned. Accordingly, a "Stealth bombern is a 
future bomber of unspecified design, but presumed to incorporate those 
advances collectively known as Stealth. Some Stealth-related innovations may 
be used in other aircraft before an all-new Stealth fighter or bomber is 
finally produced. 
Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB) -- The Air Force uses this term to refer 
to an aircraft incorporating technological innovations that are not mature 
enough to be exploited in current production. So-called "Stealthw 
technologies would presumably constitute a large proportion of such 
innovations. Accordingly, "Stealth aircraftm and "ATB" are used 
interchangeably. An advanced technology bomber was one of the Multi-Role 
Bomber candidates specified by P.L. 96-342; yet the provision for an IOC by 
1987 was widely perceived as effectively excluding an ATB as a serious 
candidate for MRB or, likewise, LRCA. Accordingly, ATB presently refers to a 
longer-term R&D program. 
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BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS 
BOMBER ROLES 
SAC now operates 343 B-52 long range strategic bombers, (along with 66 
medium-range FB-111A bombers). Of that number, 168 "GW models and 96 "Hw 
models are used in the alert force for strategic retaliation. Models G and H 
are the most modern B-52s produced, having entered service between 1958 and 
1962. Another 79 "Dm models are considered available primarily for 
non-strategic missions; D models are somewhat older. 
Penetration Role 
The United States nuclear deterrent force began with intercontinental 
range bombers, and they have remained a prime delivery system. Today, 
alongside the other "legs" of the U.S. strategic triad (ICBMs and SLBMs), 
bombers are allocated a share of nuclear weapons that accounts for about half 
the destructive power (in megatonnage) of the total U.S. inventory. 
Although some question the continued viability of manned aircraft in 
high-threat environments of the future, others believe that penetrating 
bombers will continue to offer unique attributes of value for strategic 
deterrence: 
(1) Bombers may be withheld from an initial nuclear 
exchange without added risk to their survival, 
permitting their selective use to influence 
enemy and allied actions in the post-strike 
environment. 
(2) Bombers can be recalled after dispatch, 
contributing to strategic flexibility and 
crisis stability. 
(3) Bombers can engage mobile targets and destroy 
them even if hardened. 
( 4 )  Several other claims made for bombers seem 
valid only under certain conditions: 
-- Crews can conduct reliable and immediate 
damage assessment (doubtful with nuclear 
weapons) . 
-- Bombers can attack a series of targets or 
engage targets of opportunity (doubtful in 
heavily defended areas). 
These attributes alone may not justify the requirement for bombers, but 
the capability of U.S. bombers to penetrate Soviet defenses remains a 
strategic requirement in current U.S. defense policy. 
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Cruise Missile Role 
Beginning in 1982, B-52s will assume a second, less demanding, strategic 
role as cruise missile launchers. All G models gradually will be withdrawn as 
Itpenetrating bombers" so that they will constitute strictly a stand-off force 
by 1990. Currently, G models entering scheduled overhaul are being equipped 
with internal and external carriage assemblies and new offensive avionics 
systems to command the 12 or 20 ALCMs that will be carried on each aircraft. 
H models are being equipped with the same offensive avionics systems, but the 
necessary structural changes for carrying ALCMs await a future decision over 
whether or when to withdraw H models from service as penetrators. 
Current plans call for deploying about 3000 ALCMs by 1990. If the B-52s 
carry nothing but ALCMs (at the maximum of 20 each), about 150 aircraft would 
suffice. By choosing to use the entire inventory of G models and perhaps H 
models, however, the Air Force can achieve the ALCM force objective while 
permitting ALCMs to be loaded in combination with bombs and Short-Range 
Attack Missiles (SRAM). On that basis, the Air Force will be able to use 
converted B-52s in a "shoot and penetrate" role during the 1980's transition 
period to an "all stand-off" role. 
General-Purpose Role 
A third role for B-52s is conventional bombing, most recently exemplified 
in operations during the Vietnam war. SAC'S 79 D model B-52s are outfitted 
for a maximum payload of non-nuclear gravity bombs (108, compared with 27 for 
other models), and are considered available primarily for general-purpose 
use, such as wcounter-interventionw to defend U.S. interests against armed 
aggression in Southwest Asia or Europe, for example. 
Other possible missions for bombers add to the B-52s' general-purpose 
rationale. They may be used in support of naval operations; mine-laying has 
been an accepted mission for B-52s in the past, as in the closing of Haiphong 
Harbor. Bomber advocates note several additional maritime roles that B-52s 
or their successors should be able to perform in conventional warfare, e.g., 
attacking hostile surface ships and contributing to U.S. fleet air defense 
against Backfire bombers. 
Need for Bombers in Non-Strategic Roles 
The need for bombers in conventional wartime roles follows from certain 
assumptions about U.S. and Soviet strategies and force structures to be used 
in meeting possible contingencies. In the case of a NATO contingency, 
tactical air forces constitute the primary strike force for blunting a Warsaw 
Pact advance, and U.S. forward-based systems such as F-111s pose the threat 
of deeper interdiction and tactical nuclear strikes as an added deterrent to 
Soviet aggression. The contribution of conventionally-armed bombers within 
NATO's "flexible responsem doctrine may be open to question. If 
justification for bombers in this role is in terms of nsupplementing" the 
tactical strike force, Congress might ask why supplements are needed, and how 
responsibility for carrying out those missions is being shared, if both SAC 
and other commands are involved. 
The scenario most mentioned to substantiate the need for a conventional 
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bomber force is further Soviet intervention in Southwest Asia. If vital U.S. 
interests in the Persian Gulf region were threatened, it is argued, 
long-range strike forces would be needed to slow the advance of Soviet or 
proxy forces until U.S. ground forces could be brought to bear in sufficient 
number. Bomber advocates note that the border area between the USSR and 
Iran, for example, would be beyond the range of carrier-based interdiction 
aircraft unless carriers exposed themselves dangerously by entering the 
Persian Gulf. B-52s and follow-on bombers would offer the desired 
combination of range and payload for attacking distant and extended targets, 
according to this view. 
Strategic Projection Force 
The FY82 budget request for the Strategic Projection Force (SPF) responds 
to the Persian Gulf scenario, among others. This program would upgrade 
long-distance interdiction bombing capability as a complement to Rapid 
Deployment Forces (RDF). The SPF program would take 35 H model B-52s and 
configure them for improved general purpose use, including an expanded 
capacity for 500-lb bombs. According to Air Force spokesmen, the plan to 
convert H models instead of using D models, which already carry the maximum 
conventional payload, is based on the greater range and reliability of the 
newer aircraft. 
REASONS ADVANCED FOR REPLACING B-52s 
The Air Force's Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA) concept for a new 
strategic bomber responds to desires for an aircraft well-suited to a range 
of conventional uses also. Likewise, the "Multi-Role Bomberw concept 
mandated by the 96th Congress envisions general-purpose missions as well as 
strategic potential. Despite the great significance that non-nuclear power 
projection roles have been given in the marketing and promotion of certain 
candidate aircraft, these arguments relate generally to why bombers are 
useful, and not to why the U.S. needs new ones. By contrast, most arguments 
for replacing the B-52s are expressed in terms of the U.S.-Soviet strategic 
competition, and particularly the U.S. objective of penetrating future 
strategic defenses being developed by the Soviet Union. 
Serviceability of the B-52s 
A commonly-heard complaint about B-52s is that they will soon be older 
than the pilots flying them. While the B-52 represents a product of 1950's 
technology, modifications to G and H models have helped adapt them to new 
operating environments. Nevertheless, age imposes limits on the Suture 
service that B-52s can reliably offer, and, hence, on the readiness of the 
bomber force. 
As strategic bombers, B-52s would fly the following mission profile in a 
general war: Take off from their dispersed bases before the impact of 
attacking warheads, fly at high altitude intercontinentally toward assigned 
targets, drop to low altitude to evade and defeat enemy air defenses, survive 
to reach and destroy their objectives, and then escape to recovery bases. 
Flight at low altitudes keeps an aircraft hidden from defending ground radars 
as long as possible, combines with speed to limit the engagement time of air 
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defense weapons, and conceals an aircraft from non-discriminating airborne 
radar systems by mixing its radar image with other signals, known as "ground 
clutter," reflected from the earth's surface. 
Low flight combines with deception to permit penetration. Accordingly, 
B-52s rely on electronic countermeasures (ECM) to suppress, distort, or 
otherwise "jam" the radar echo that a hostile fire control system receives. 
ECM masks the presence of attacking aircraft or deceives the defending 
weapons about the number, size, location, speed, or other aspects of the 
target, once detected. ECM systems draw considerable amounts of power from 
their aircraft, however, imposing limits on the capability an aircraft can 
support. 
The flight profile of an emergency take-off and a penetration mission 
places considerable stress on an airframe and demands on avionics. Although 
the ability of an aircraft to withstand such use declines with age, recent 
studies have confirmed that the B-52 airframe is still reliable; and by using 
B-52s as cruise missile platforms, the Air Force expects the system to be 
serviceable almost until 2000. As the aircraft grows older, however, 
incidents of failure may be expected to increase, lowering aircraft 
availability rates and adding to the costs of operating them. 
Vulnerability to Soviet Air Defenses 
Although the future reliability and maintainability of B-52s are of 
concern, the more critical reason for a new bomber, in the Air Force view, is 
improving Soviet air defenses. The Soviet Union already has deployed over 
6,000 ground radars, 12,800 surface-to-air missile launchers, and 2,550 
interceptor aircraft. General Ellis, Commander-in-Chief of SAC, estimates 
that 75% of an attacking B-52 force would be expected to survive Soviet 
defenses around 1985. The Soviet Union is constantly improving those 
defenses, however, leading the Air Force to conclude that B-52s would be 
highly vulnerable as a penetrating bomber force by 1990. Their utility until 
then depends on the rate of Soviet progress in the following areas: 
-- Deployment of a Soviet Union AWACS (Airborne 
Warning and Control System) aircraft (termed 
SUAWACS) that provides radar surveillance and 
coordinates interceptors1 fire control over 
extended ranges, similar to the U.S. AWACS. 
With sophisticated "look-downw radar, it will 
be able to distinguish low-flying aircraft 
from ground clutter. 
- - Deployment of a new generation of 
fighter/interceptor aircraft whose improved 
radar and air-to-air missiles will provide 
a "look down-shoot downw (LDSD) capability 
similar to U.S. F-15s. 
Although the Air Force is concerned about improved Soviet capabilities 
represented in the new SA-10 air defense missiles and in an integrated 
communications and electonic warfare system as well, it is the look-down 
shoot-down (LDSD) prospect particularly that threatens to eliminate the 
protection now afforded U.S. aircraft by low-level flight. 
The B-52's chances of survival might be extended beyond the 1980s by 
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adding new systems of defensive avionics. Sentiment in the Congress, 
however, favors a new bomber for the penetrating mission. There is concern 
that the effectiveness of advanced "active defensesw like electronic 
countermeasures (ECM) cannot fully compensate for the limitations of the 
B-52's less advanced "passive defenses," related to size, propulsion system 
and fabrication materials. Such inherent characteristics largely determine 
an aircraft's "radar cross section" (RCS) , which refers to the 
identifiability of the radar image an aircraft reflects back. Thus, the 
requirement for a new bomber aircraft is widely discussed in terms of 
improved design features to present a significantly lower RCS than existing 
aircraft, thus reducing susceptibility to radar aetection and tracking. 
Diversifying and Modernizing 
Another major reason given for replacing B-52s as penetrators is that they 
have already been scheduled to retire from that role and to serve as cruise 
missile carriers. By terms of the current rationale, cruise missiles carried 
and launched by SAC aircraft would not alter the doctrinal "triad" of U.S. 
strategic weapons. Rather, it is held that ALCMs will preserve the viability 
of the "air-breathing" leg more effectively than bombers alone, because 
"diversification" of this leg compels Soviet air defenses to contend with two 
kinds of attacking systems. Thus, the objectives of deploying ALCMs and 
simultaneously replacing B-52s as penetrators serve the goal of diversifying 
and modernizing bomber forces. The Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Research and Development, General Kelly Burke, argues that any investment in 
a new bomber is worthwhile if it successfully induces the Soviet Union to 
spend a disproportionately greater amount of its resources in preparing 
defenses against it. 
Pursuing two objectives simultaneously concentrates the costs in a few 
years, and critics of this approach argue that deployment of new ALCMs makes 
it unnecessary to keep a large number of penetrating bombers. They feel that 
H model B-52s a1on.e would constitute an adequate force of penetrators over 
the period while ALCMs are being phased in on G models. By deferring bomber 
modernization until around 1990, however, such a solution would have to 
provide not only a new penetrator, but a second-generation cruise missile 
carrier as well, since B-52s in any capacity will be retired before 2000; 
(Air Force spokesmen estimate between 1993 and 1998). Thus, the two elements 
of diversification must be confronted simultaneously, whether now or later, 
because of the finite service life of the B-52s. 
CONGRESSIONAL POSITIONS 
Congressional viewpoints on the bomber issue are reflected in current 
versions of the FY82 Defense Authorization Bill and in provisions of last 
year's Defense Authorization bill (P.L. 96-342). 
Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1981 (P.L. 96-342) 
Section 204(a) directs the Secretary of Defense to develop "a strategic 
multi-role bomber which maximizes range, payload, and ability to perform the 
missions of conventional bomber, cruise missile launch platform, and nuclear 
weapons delivery system in both the tactical and strategic role." This law 
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reflects Congressional intent to provide a replacement for the B-52 in each 
of its roles. Air Force plans for LRCA now make it clear, however, that the 
aircraft will assume its cruise missile-launching role only around the middle 
of its service life, when its effectiveness as a penetrator will have 
declined; 1995 is the suggested date. The "multi-role bomber," therefore, 
will not be used to provide a strategic penetration capability beyond that 
time. 
P.L. 96-342 directed the Secretary of Defense to consider several 
candidates for the new multi-role bomber, to include the B-1, the FB-111B/C, 
and an "advanced technology bomberw (ATB), which would exploit innovations in 
a variety of emerging technologies, collectively known. as "Stealth." Another 
provision states that development of the bomber must be guided by an Initial 
Operating Capability (IOC-the deployment of the first squadron of aircraft) 
not later than 1987. Realistically, an ATB candidate could not meet that 
requirement, although some supporters of that language may have thought 
otherwise at the time. 
House of Representatives 
Reporting the FY82 Defense Authorization bill (H.Rept. 97-71) , the House 
Armed Services Committee affirmed the 1987 deadline for a multi-role bomber, 
specifying July 1, 1987. Moreover, the Committee recommended that the Air 
Force procure B-1s in a configuration as near as possible to the prototype 
B-1s purchased before President Carter's 1977 decision to terminate 
production. This recommendation is apparently based on desires to deploy the 
aircraft in as short a time and with as little unnecessary expense as 
possible. A selection on that basis would probably provide a relatively 
high-performance variant, including a supersonic capability. 
As reported and subsequently passed, the bill also authorizes Research, 
Development, Test and Evaluption (RDTFiE). funding for an advanced technology 
aircraft. This authorization supports the Air Force's position that a B-1 
should be acquired in the near-term as a multi-role bomber, and a more 
advanced penetrator should be acquired over the longer-term. Thus, the House 
bill supports a "two-bomber programw of a Long Range Combat Aircraft (LRCA), 
and a future advanced technology bomber (ATB). 
Senate 
Defense bills passed by the Senate in the 96th Congress were not 
supportive of a revived B-1 program. The llmulti-role bomberH language passed 
in P.L. 96-342 represented a compromise between a stretched F/FB-111, favored 
by the Senate Armed Services Committee, and a B-1 derivative Strategic 
Weapons Launcher (SWL), regarded by some as a first step toward a full B-1 
program. By its adoption in conference, the Senate's language not only 
averted a SWL program, but it also undercut a competing strategy to produce a 
compromise in conference that would settle on a B-1. Thus, while the 
"multi-rolew terminology has been perceived as favoring the B-1, it actually 
dampened the B-1's immediate prospects in 1980. The prevalent Senate 
position in the 96th Congress sought to leave open the options presented by 
emerging technologies. If a two-bomber approach were to be necessary, the 
Senate favored the FB-111B/C as an "interim bomberw; that program was 
originally approved in the Senate version of the FY81 Defense Authorization 
bill. 
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The FY82 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 8151, reported by the Armed 
Services Committee (S.Rept. 97-58), and passed May 14, 1981, approves the 
Administration's request for bomber funding. The Senate version does not 
specify a choice, but it makes the obligation of funds contingent upon a 
recommendation by the President, and open to a concurrent resolution of 
disapproval by Congress. The Armed Services committee noted that a new 
bomber is needed not only for the strategic role, but for demanding 
conventional missions as well, and that a follow-on cruise missile carrier 
would hedge against degraded reliability or pre-launch survivability of B-52 
carriers. From this language, it appears that Senate support for a B-l 
program may have grown in the 97th Congress; but Senator Tower, Chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, has expressed reservations about the 
affordability of B-1s with an ATB. 
OPTIONS AND ARGUMENTS 
The Need for a "Two-Bomberw Program 
While sharing the ultimate objective of deploying an ATB, many bomber 
advocates would prefer to precede it with an aircraft of more predictable 
capability, cost, and availability. This group believes that Stealth 
technology can be applied to future aircraft more completely and more 
effectively if development is not rushed. Accordingly, many have concluded 
that a "two-bomber programw is needed, on the assumption that Soviet air 
defenses effectively will have "closed the doorw on B-52 penetrators by 1990, 
and that ALCMs alone should not be relied upon to maintain the strategic 
balance in the interim between generations of penetrators. The issues which 
follow from these conclusions are: (1) How much of an investment to make, 
(2) how much capability to build, and ( 3 )  how many years' use to expect in an 
aircraft short of an ATB. These questions will remain relevant as Congress 
monitors the progress of the LRCA program. 
The B-1 Alternative: "Near-Termw or Long-Term? 
B-1 proponents view the ATB as a high risk alternative, both financially 
and technically. Past experience with previous programs to replace the B-52 
(AMSA, B-70, B-1) leads many to fear the same fate for Stealth; and they 
discourage waiting for Stealth because that would commit the country to 
developing an all-new aircraft by around 1990, whatever the cost. That could 
place the Department of Defense in a less favorable bargaining position for 
dealing with aircraft manufacturers, some assert, whereas a B-1 program and 
an ATB program would introduce competition and offer the Air Force more 
flexibility. 
While some B-1 backers foresee its long-term role as a penetrator, the Air 
Force requested 100 B-1s as "near-term1' penetrators, preferring an ATB as the 
ultimate replacement for the B-52 in that role. Illustrative plans would 
phase the B-1 in as a penetrator from 1987 to 1990, then phase it in as a 
cruise missile carrier beginning around 1995. Its place as a penetrator 
would then be taken by an ATB, (of which the Air Force hopes to build 132). 
Given fiscal constraints, some B-l backers suspect that LRCA, once begun, 
Will be the only new bomber program for the remainder of this century. 
Accordingly, they feel the B-1 should be acquired in the full number needed 
to replace the B-52s as they retire from service in all roles. B-1 advocates 
note that the synergistic effects of its new design features with its ALQ-161 
ECM system should reduce its previous RCS by a factor of 10, and assure its 
effectiveness as a penetrator "well into the 1990s." They suggest that if 
technological advances offer increased advantages for penetrating aircraft, 
they can be added to the B-1 LRCA. For example, development of laser 
defenses against surface-to-air missiles would permit high-altitude 
penetration, as suggested by former Air Force Secretary Hans Mark. 
This difference of approach among those who support a B-1 alternative 
leads to disagreement over how to configure the aircraft, now that it has 
been chosen for the LRCA program. For example, should the B-1s be 
constructed initially with the features needed only later to carry cruise 
missiles? And should a supersonic dash capability be included? Neither was 
initially provided for within the funding requested by the Administration, 
but October budget revisions added about $800 million in modifications for 
cruise missile carriage. 
The "Baseline Variant" 
The precise configuration of the new B-1 for LRCA has not been publicized, 
but it builds on the "core aircraft" Which would be common to any variant, 
reportedly keeping 85% of the design features from the original B-1. Any 
number of combinations could be conceived to constitute many different 
variants, both for adding to the capability of the original and for 
economizing somewhat. Much of the Work over recent months by both the Air 
Force Bomber Office and the OSD Bomber Study Group has involved defining 
competing configurations and developing cost estimates for each, then 
conducting cost-effectiveness analyses for each variant in relation to each 
other and to notional advanced technology candidates. 
The baseline variant being promoted by Rockwell International would be 
designed to fly farther than the original B-1, and would have an increased 
payload. The requirement for a multi-role configuration as well as for 
penetrating improved defenses calls for other changes, andb the added costs 
which result are to be offset in part by reductions in the maximum speed and 
altitude attainable by the aircraft (from 70,000 feet to 42,000 feet). 
Accordingly, the following modifications to the earlier aircraft may be 
expected in the B-1 LRCA: 
-- Reduction in supersonic performance from Mach 
1.6 to Mach 1.2 (attainable only at high 
altitudes). Low-level supersonic "dashw capability will 
be abandoned. 
-- Changes in the engine nacelles to reduce radar 
cross section. 
-- Redesign of the weapons bay to include a movable 
forward bulkhead for a larger number of ordnance 
(and fuel) loading options, including cruise 
missiles. 
-- Provisions for external stores (fuel or weapons) 
under the fuselage. 
-- Use of the new offensive avionics syst.em being 
installed in B-52s. 
-- Improvements in defensive avionics capabilities 
(ECM) . 
The resulting aircraft, powered by four General Electric FlOl engines, 
could take off weighing as much as 477,000 lb, (compared to 395,000 lb 
previously) with a maximum ordnance load of 38 nuclear gravity bombs and 
SRAMs or, in later years, 30 cruise missiles. The maximum range at that 
payload has not been publicized, but Air Force spokesmen claim that in 
unrefueled operational flight profiles, the B-1 variant could out-distance a 
B-52 H by a couple of percentage points. Rockwell International adds that, 
without refueling, the LRCA should be able to perform the strategic mission 
that the original B-1 could accomplish with one refueling. 
Schedule 
Air Force Systems Division has issued an estimate of the B-1 variant's 
availability, based on a go-ahead around July 1, 1981. By adjusting that 
starting date to Nov. 1, the first delivery would be made in June 1985 and 
the last delivery in October 1988; IOC would occur in December 1986. 
InBustryqs estimates tend to be more optimistic than the Air Force's, because 
of different assumptions about the work force's learning curve. 
Costs 
Procurement costs for B-1 derivative aircraft depend on the variant 
chosen; accordingly, reports of findings by the Bomber Study Group as high as 
$24.6 billion contrast with the initial Air Force estimate of $19.7 billion 
(in FY81 terms). Based on current Administration projections of inflation 
over the years of a LRCA procurement program, the "baseline9' cost goal of 
$20.5 billion will actually amount to $27.9 billion by the time of program 
completion. 
Critics of the B-1 proposal argue that even an equivalent projection based 
on more realistic inflation factors would still underestimate the total cost 
of LRCA aquisition. While Air Force spokesmen insist their estimates are 
firm, especially with the prospect of multi-year contracting for much of the 
program, doubters point to the absence of contracts at present, and note that 
the baseline cost estimate excludes likely expenses for a simulator program 
($300 million), a second inertial guidance system ($220 million), or a 
"permissive action Pink" to provide for disarming nuclear weapons as a safety 
measure ($50 million). In October, the Air Force's $19.7 billion target was 
revised to $20.5 billion in FY81 terms, reflecting primarily the 
Administration's decision to proceed at the outset with provisions for cruise 
missile carriage, both internally and externally. The $800 million 
difference also includes a new radio system. Some other costs for complete 
cruise missile integration may be expected at the time operational 
COnVersiOn~ of LRCAs are actually made (in the 1990s); but in FY82 terms, the 
program to acquire the 100 aircraft with an IOC of late 1986 is estimated to 
cost $22 billion. 
A draft GAO critique of the B-1 estimates, reported in the Washington Post 
(Oct. 29, 1981), found false economies in the omission of likely program 
expenses; one example was the requirement to match planned avionics systems 
to new Air Force specifications, perhaps costing an added $86 million, and 
delaying the schedule of production by 6 to 12 months. The Air Force and DOD 
had not been given their customary opportunity to review or comment on the 
draft. A CBO estimate, based on their inflation figures and the assumptions 
of the GAO study, projected a "then-year" cost of almost $40 billion. 
The opportunity for the U.S. to redeem much of the $5 to $6 billion in 
research and development costs already invested in the original B-1 program, 
and for industries to regain work that was lost as a result of the 1977 
decision, has remained an important consideration, economically as well as 
politically, in support for the B-1. 
Affordability of the "Two-Bomber" Program 
Among those committed to deploying a new bomber, the greatest concern with 
the B-1 has been expressed by William Perry: "Spending billions on the B-1 
would rule out a Stealth follow-on." Although outlays in the current 
five-year plan would be higher in the case of a two-bomber (B-~/ATB) program 
than for an all-Stealth program, the few cost estimates for total program 
costs have been in the same broad range both for 250 ATBs and for a mix of 
B-1s and ATBs totalling the same number. Thus, the case has not been made 
for the argument that the two-bomber approach per se is more costly. Rather, 
the primary argument is that sufficient funding will not be provided over the 
period needed to complete a $40-$60 billion program, regardless of what kind. 
The bomber's ultimate share of defense resources, in other words, is expected 
to be considerably less, but with different consequences for the two 
approaches: An all-ATB program would be slowed or reduced somewhat; in the 
case of a two-bomber program, however, the near-term B-1 would be deployed, 
and the longer-term ATB might not. Stealth proponents decry that prospect, 
insisting that an ATB can be available soon enough to alleviate the need for 
another aircraft, and that a B-1 could not satisfy the long-term 
requirements. 
Early in the 97th Congress, prospects for a "two-bomber" approach were 
enhanced by perceptions that new support for defense spending would make such 
a choice politically more attractive than in the past. The durability of 
that support is coming into question, however; and, as defense spending 
levels are held short of the Administration's initial projections, the 
two-bomber approach may prove particularly vulnerable to future budget cuts. 
Strategic initiatives for a new bomber and the MX were specifically insulated 
from the $2 billion in defense cuts made during the Administration's FY82 
budget revisions in October, however. 
Once the B-1 program has started, cuts could not easily be made there, 
especially since that could appear to duplicate the Carter Administration's 
controversial decision in 1977. Thus, for Stealth proponents, the 
significance of the President's choice, while endorsing the goal of an ATB, 
is that the Stealth program has been placed at some greater risk, since it 
becomes hostage to the fortunes of the Reagan economic program as a whole and 
the level of Support for defense spending. Defense officials concede, in any 
event, that funding for the development of an ATB will be less now than if 
the decision had been made to proceed directly with a Stealth bomber. 
Replacing B-52s Directly With a Stealth Penetrator 
On Aug. 22, 1980, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown revealed that 
the United States had been developing so-called "Stealthw technology "which 
alters the military balance significantly." It is widely believed that only 
an ATB with Stealth technology could penetrate Soviet air defenses throughout 
the 1990s and possibly for sometime thereafter. Some even argue that Soviet 
defenses have already incorporated advances that responded specifically to 
the prospect of a B-1 threat. Consequently, Stealth supporters argue that 
the B-52 should be replaced with nothing short of an ATB. Illustrative plans 
for an all-ATB replacement program envision about 250 new aircraft. 
Since ATB proponents see a multi-role B-1 as the primary threat to early 
Stealth deployment, they argue that perceptions of the B-1 inevitably have 
been tainted by its previous cancellation, and that selection now of a 
previous "losern would not serve the goals of the Congress or the new 
Administration. Proponents argue that H model B-52s will retain sufficient 
penetrating capability over the time of transition, and that ALCMs should be 
fully deployed by 1990, while MX deployment will have strengthened the ICBM 
force, thus compensating for a reduced number of penetrating bombers during 
the ATB building period. 
A particularly strong argument in closing weeks of the debate was the 
assertion -- at one point supported by Secretary Weinberger, but then 
retracted -- that B-1s would fail as penetrators by 1990. 
Stealth technologies combine aircraft design features and defensive 
countermeasures to reduce the radar reflection (radar cross section or RCS) 
and mask energy emissions of aircraft, thus improving their abilities to 
elude Soviet defenses. Innovations for this purpose reported in the past 
have involved reducing the weight of the aircraft, and the size of the tail 
section in particular, using non-metallic and radar absorbing materials, 
keeping flat or angular surfaces and "resonantw cavities to a minimum, 
limiting the number of engines, modifying the shape and placement of engine 
air intakes, reducing engine exhaust temperatures, and treating fuels to 
reduce infrared emissions in the spectral bands used by Soviet detectors. 
Since Secretary Brown's announcement, however, little has been said about the 
program in open sources to identify the specifics of current Stealth research 
and development. 
Schedule 
Because of uncertainties about how far Stealth technology has evolved and 
how much it will cost in application to a bomber, a deployment schedule for 
an ATB cannot be specified. These unknowns form a part of the debate over 
options for replacing the B-52s. General Ellis, former SAC Commander, 
estimated that a prototype ATB could be flown in 1985 and an IOC, achieved by 
1990. This prediction appears to rest on fully funding a one-bomber program 
for an ATB, however. 
The views of former Undersecretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, William Perry, reflect the difficulties in judging the potential 
of Stealth: he testified last year that he has "unbounded confidencen in 
Stealth technology, but that "it has not yet reached a state of maturity for 
application to bombers in the near future." Nevertheless, testifying this 
year, he stated his opposition to an interim program, based on his estimate 
that production of a Stealth aircraft could begin as early as 1988. The Air 
Force Scientific Advisory Board has concluded that 1992 would be the earliest 
possible IOC for an ATB. 
Even if the early projections of Stealth availability are not realized, 
the need for an interim penetrator is not accepted by hold-outs for an ATB. 
They argue that H model B-52s will retain sufficient penetrating capability 
over the time of transition, and that ALCMs should be fully deployed by 1990, 
while MX deployment will have strengthened the ICBM force, thus compensating 
for a reduced number of penetrating bombers during the ATB building period. 
It is widely assumed that the ATB would serve solely as a penetrator, 
since its size and design would be optimized for that mission. If an all-ATB 
program were chosen on that basis, some other aircraft would be needed to 
replace cruise missile-carrying B-52s. On the other hand, if plans exist to 
adapt the Stealth bomber for Cruise missile carriage, that would alleviate 
the requirement not only for a follow-on cruise missile platform for the long 
term, but also for the LRCA as a cruise missile carrier in the 1990s. 
costs 
The Northrop Corporation has been chosen as the prime contractor to 
develop a Stealth bomber, but until a definite aircraft design can be 
evaluated, cost estimates for an ATB will have limited reliability. Also, in 
weighing cost estimates, the distinction must be made between an all-ATB 
replacement program (about 250 aircraft) and a wfollow-onw program to produce 
100 to 150 Stealth bombers after LRCA have been acquired. In the case of an 
all-ATB approach, the Stealth program would be directed toward the earliest 
achievable IOC, and some argue that R&D costs would be minimized if the 
program were fully funded on that basis. An added drawback to the smaller 
program, some point out, is that the price per aircraft would be higher, 
since R & D  costs would be recouped over a lesser number of aircraft. 
Regardless of whether an all-ATB program a follow-on program were chosen, 
there will probably be little difference in outlays for Stealth during the 
next five years, since procurement cannot begin in any event until the 
necessary R&D has been completed. Accordingly, the cost difference between 
the two over the period of the current Five-Year Defense Plan (FYDP) is 
essentially the amount of the B-1 program. 
Estimates reported to date for a program of 250 ATB range from $41 billion 
to $56 billion. Estimates for the Stealth portion of a two-bomber program 
range from $22 billion to $35 billion. By adding the cost of the B-1 program 
to the latter set of figures, rough estimates thus suggest an equivalent cost 
over the acquisition of either an all-ATB program or a two-bomber program. 
On that basis, the primary cost advantage of an all-stealth program is that 
it defers the major expenditures for bomber modernization for several years. 
This may also represent a vulverability, however, in that the program could 
be affected by intervening changes before production finally begins. 
Finally, some Stealth proponents argue that an all-ATB program would cost 
less than a mix of B-1s and Stealth totalling the same number; this implies 
that Stealth bombers per unit may cost less than B-1s. Cost estimates have 
not yet been published to substantiate that claim; and at this point, they 
would be viewed with skepticism anyway. In addition, it is not clear that 
B-1s and ATBs should be treated as equivalent capabilities, one for one. 
Thus, the primary cost argument in favor of the Stealth bomber remains the 
claim that B-1s can be dispensed with. 
The Air Force counters that claim by its estimates that it would cost less 
to buy B-1s in the interim than to modernize the B-52s and FB-111s 
sufficiently to continue relying on them. The specifics of such a 
modification program have not been discussed; but even excluding normal 
operations and maintenance expenses, extending the life of B-52s and today's 
FB-111s as strategic penetrators reportedly could cost $20 to $28 billion. 
It is unclear how much of that expense, if any, would be incurred anyway in 
modifying the B-52s for cruise missile carriage in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Evolving Role of the Bomber 
Preferences in how to modernize the bomber force follow from assumptions 
about the future role of bombers and about how the candidate aircraft will 
serve those roles. To date, the Stealth bomber has been discussed almost 
exclusively as a strategic penetrator. The LRCA by contrast, has been 
justified largely in terms of its capacity for collateral as well as 
strategic missions. There is concern that an aircraft chosen on that basis 
may not serve in the strategic role -- or in any single role -- with the 
greatest effectiveness. Conceptually, the B-1 LRCA is said to be suited to 
the following conventional or tactical nuclear missions; others may be added: 
(1) Counter-intervention force in western Europe, 
supplementing other strike forces; 
(2) power projection and counter-intervention 
force in Southwest Asia; 
(3) mining operations to protect the sea lines of 
communication; 
(4) maritime support in the form of anti-surface 
ship operations; 
(5) fleet air defense, using air-to-air missiles 
against Soviet naval Backfire bombers. 
The list of collateral missions for Which the LRCA might prove useful, 
although arguably essential, was capped by retiring Air Force General Alton 
Slay, when he added, "dropping hay to stranded yaks in Katmandu." 
For many, past events in the Persian Gulf region have underlined the need 
for the United States to have a power projection capability that can be 
brought to bear world-wide. While long-range bombers may offer a unique 
combination of range and payload needed for some cases, existing naval and 
amphibious forces, sea-based aviation, or land-based tactical air forces may 
adequately meet the needs of other non-strategic circumstances. 
Although Congress has endorsed the need for a new bomber with a 
penetrating capability, some continue to regard the manned bomber as an 
obsolescent weapon system. Accordingly, they are opposed even to an ATB, 
arguing that resources will be better spent on more cost-effective cruise 
missiles and future unmanned delivery vehicles. They note that Stealth is 
equally applicable to those systems, and could be used more effectively with 
ALCMs. Former CIA Director Turner has expressed the view that manned 
aircraft in general will be overtaken not just by Soviet defenses, but by the 
march of technology on all sides. In his view, the United States will not 
have the chance to receive back the deterrent value of its investment in any 
new bomber. 
Ultimately, improvements in air defenses may force a decline in the use of 
costly aircraft against strategic targets. Part of the five-point strategic 
program announced by President Reagan along with bomber modernization was the 
plan to deploy nuclear cruise missiles aboard U.S. attack submarines. The 
development of long-range sea-based cruise missiles for use against targets 
ashore could soon overtake many advantages now perceived in manned aircraft, 
including bombers. 
BOMBER COMPARISONS 
B-52 B-1B Stealth 
Actual or planned inventory 350 100 132-250 
IOC as penetrator - 1986 1990s 
End of use as penetrator 1990 1995 2000+ 
IOC as cruise missile platform 1982 1995 N/A 
End of use as ALCM platform 2000 2000+ N/A 
Procurement/modernization 
program costs 
( $  billions, FY 81) 20-28 20.5-22 22-35/ 
41-56 
Maximum loading per aircraft 
Nuclear gravity bombs/SRAMs 12 3 8 ? 
ALCMs 20 22/30 N/A 
Conventional bombs 27/108 128 N/A 
Radar cross section (sq m) 90-100 1 ? 
Penetration speed (Mach) .55 .85 ? 
Primary ECM system ALQ-122 ALQ-161 ? 
Note: All candidate aircraft must meet SAC specifications for 
dispersability to multiple airfields, safe escape time on 
notice of attack, and protection ("hardness") against the 
secondary effects of nuclear explosions, including 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) . 
LEGISLATION 
P.L. 97-86, S. 815 
Department of Defense Authorization Bill, 1982. Both bills provide $302 
million for LRCA RDT&EI as requested by the Administration, and $1942 million 
for procurement, also as requested. The Senate version includes $179 million 
requested for procurement of spares; the House version does not. Therefore, 
H.R. 3519 approves $2.244 billion; S. 815 approves $2.423 billion for LRCA. 
The House version, reported by the Armed Services Committee on May 15, 1981 
(H.Rept. 97-71), approves procurement funding based on the choice of a B-1 
LRCA, with the provision that the obligation of funds for an advanced 
technology bomber instead, if recommended in the national interest by 
President Reagan, would require affirmative action by both houses within 60 
days of that recommendation. The Committee Report recommends a supersonic 
B-1 with minimal changes to the original program. The Senate version, 
reported by the Armed Services Committee on May 6, 1981 (S.Rept. 97-58), and 
passed by a vote of 92 to 
makes the obligation of 
President, and open to re 
S. 815 passed the House, 
held. Agreement by House 
The conference report (H. 
billion in authorizations 
Combat Aircraft in FY82. 
the B-1 bomber beginning 
report Nov. 5; the House 
President Nov. 19, and si 
1 on May 14, does not specify an alternative, but 
funds contingent upon a recommendation by the 
solutions of disapproval in both Houses of Congress. 
amended, July 16, in lieu of H.R. 3519. Conferences 
and Senate conferees were announced Oct. 30, 1981. 
Rept. 97-311), dated Nov. 3, 1981, recommends $2.1 
for development and procurement of the Long Range 
Authorizations will be available for obligation to 
Nov. 18, 1981. The Senate agreed to the conference 
agreed Nov. 17. The bill was presented to the 
.gned into law on Dec. 1, 1981 (P.L. 97-86). 
P.L. 97-114, H.R. 4995 
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1982. As reported by the 
Committee on Appropriations (H.Rept. 97-933) on Nov. 16, and subsequently 
passed on Nov. 18, 1981, $2,092.9 million is recommended for the LRCA 
program, including $1,574 million for procurement, $227 million for advance 
procurement, and $291.9 million for RDT&E. The total is about $330 million 
less than requested by the Administration; comparison with the Administration 
request is complicated, however, by the Oct. 2 revision to the March 1981 
budget request. In both requests, funding for the LRCA totalled $2.423 
billion; the Oct. 2 revision, however, redistributed that amount among the 
Several activities: procurement was increased slightly, and advance 
procurement was increased slightly. The request for initial spares (which 
had been deleted entirely in the House version of the Defense authorization 
bill) was reduced from $179 million to $51 million; the difference was then 
made up in the requested increase to RDT&E from $302 million to $471 million. 
(See chart below). The House committee reported the bill with cuts in 
procurement spending and initial spares to match authorized levels that were 
agreed to in conference after the Administration's revisions had been 
submitted. On its own initiative, the committee also cut $179.1 million from 
the revised RDT&E request, explaining that the amount was found to be 
unobligated from FY81. Appropriations to modernize B-52 aircraft were 
increased over requested levels to a recommended $500.5 million. About $62 
million of the $162.1 million increase is directed for D-model B - 5 2 ~ ~  which 
the Administration has scheduled for early retirement. In disagreeing with 
that part of the President's strategic program, the Appropriations Committee 
added about $18 million in Operations and Maintenance funds as well, to keep 
B-52Ds flying in FY82. The House passed the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill 
on Nov. 18, 1981, having first rejected amendments to delete funding for B-1 
production and to revive the FB-111B/C alternative for the LRCA program. 
Conferences held. Conference report was filed Dec. 15, 1981 and passed in 
both Houses, 334-84, and 93-4, respectively. House-passed level ($2092.9 
million total, including $1,801 million for procurement and $291.9 million 
for RDT&E); and adoption of Senate-passed language (Nunn amendment) intended 
to facilitate congressional monitoring of B-1 costs. The bill was signed 
into law (P.L. 97-114) on Dec. 29, 1981. 
S. 1857 (Hatfield) 
Department of Defense Appropriation 
Committee on Appropriations (S.Rept. 97 
passed on Dec. 4, 1981, $2,439 million 
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recommended about $350 million more for LRCA than the House Committee had 
reported the previous day. The Senate bill, as reported out of Committee, 
made no change to the Administration's request for B-52 modernization, 
including provisions for the early retirement of D-model B-52s. RDT&E 
funding for Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), however, was increased from 
the $69 million requested to $104 million. 
During extensive floor debate on the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill, the 
Senate adopted several amendments of significance for strategic bomber 
modernization. The first (offered by Mr. Nunn) requires the President to 
certify the costs of 100 B-1B aircraft before procurement funds will be made 
available, and further requires quarterly DOD program cost estimates to 
include the LRCA program, based strictly on production of 100 aircraft. The 
second (offered by Mr. Jackson) prohibits the diversion of funds as 
appropriated for the advanced technology bomber program, whose level of 
funding remains classified. A third (offered by Mr. Levin) adds $62 million 
for continued modernization of D-model B-52s, consistent with House-passed 
provisions. All were adopted by voice vote. The Senate rejected several 
amendments related to bomber programs: Mr. Hollings, to delete B-1 funding 
and increase funding accordingly for selected readiness-related items 
(28-66); Mr. Proxmire, to eliminate a 3% cost growth allowance for the B-1 
and MX programs (46-47); Mr. Levin, to restore $220 million for 4 KC-1OA 
aerial refueling tankers, cut in October budget revisions from 8 (38-55); and 
Mr. R. Byrd, to increase funding for Stealth RDT&E by $250 million (tabled, 
51-40). The last two amendments, offered Dec. 1, 1981, were characterized by 
the Republican leadership as efforts in a Democratic strategy to pre-empt 
funding for the B-1. 
The Senate version was passed on Dec. 4, 1981, 84-5. (S. 1857 was 
indefinitely postponed on Dec. 8, 1981.) Conferees were appointed, and H.R. 
4995 was passed on Dec. 15, 1981 (see above). 
Advance Initial 
Procurement Procurement Spares RDT&E Total 
Carter Request 
Reagan Request (March) 1632 310 179 302 2423 
House Authorization 1632 310 0 302 2244 
Senate Authorization 1632 310 179 302 2423 
Reagan Revisions (OCT) 1674 227 51 471 2423 
Authorization Conference 1574 227 0 302 2103 
House Appropriation 1574 
Senate Appropriation 1724.2 
Appropriation Conference 1574 
[see Defense Budget -- FY83 for further legislation.] 
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CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
01/25/82 -- Pursuant to P.L. 97-114, the FY82 Department of 
Defense Appropriation Act, President Reagan 
transmitted to Congress his certification of B-1 
cost estimates (H.Doc. no. 97-127), stating that 
acquisition of 100 B-1B aircraft is feasible within 
the $20.5 billion budget estimate by 1986. This 
appears to correspond to the Department of Defense 
cost estimate in terms of FY81 constant dollars. 
12/15/81 -- The conference report (H.Rept. 97-410) for Department of 
Defense Appropriations, 1982 (H.R. 4995) was submitted and 
passed in both Houses, providing LRCA funding of $2092.9 
million. According to a provision introduced in the Senate 
version (an amendment by Mr. Nunn) and retained in the final 
bill, funds for B-1 procurement will not be made available 
until the President certifies to Congress the costs of the 100 
B-1 aircraft. To facilitate congressional monitoring of the 
LRCA program, the Department of Defense is also required to 
include B-1 cost estimates in its quarterly reports to 
Congress. The bill provides that such reports must be 
based on 100 aircraft, reflecting congressional concern 
that the size of the program might later be cut if overly 
optimistic cost goals were accepted now and enforced. 
12/04/81 -- The Senate passed the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill (H.R. 
4995), 84-5, after adopting an amendment by Mr. Levin, 
consistent with a House-passed provision, to add $62 million 
for continued modernization of D-model B-52s, which the 
Administration proposed to retire. (The bill already 
contained $18 million to continue B-52D operations.) 
12/03/81 -- Senate consideration of the 1982 Defense Appropriation Bill 
(H.R. 4995) was dominated on this date by debate over the 
Administration's request for 100 B-1B aircraft. Mr. Hollings' 
proposed amendment to delete all B-1B funding and add 
accordingly to other programs was defeated, 28-66. The 
Senate rejected an amendment by Mr. Proxmire to eliminate 
a 3% cost growth allowance for the B-1 and MX programs, 
46-47. An amendment by Mr. Nunn, requiring the President 
to certify B-1 costs now, and requiring quarterly DOD cost 
estimates for the LRCA program of 100 B-ls, was passed 
by voice vote. Also passed by voice vote was an amendment 
by Mr. Jackson prohibiting the diversion of funds as 
appropriated for the advanced technology bomber. 
12/01/81 -- During consideration of the 1982 Defense Appropriation 
Bill (H.R. 4995), the Senate rejected two amendments 
characterized by the Republican leadership as preliminary 
moves to delete B-1 funding: Mr. Levin proposed to add 
4 KC-1OA refueling tankers, restoring the Adminstrationls 
October cut from 8 to 4 such tankers; Mr. R. Byrd proposed 
an increase to Stealth RDT&E of $250 million. Both were 
understood to require offsetting reductions elsewhere in 
the legislation, as opposed to lladd-ons.ll (The overall 
level of funding for Stealth-related programs remains 
classified.) 
-- The President signed into law the 1982 Department of Defense 
Authorization for Appropriations Act, P.L 97-86. 
11/18/81 -- The House passed the FY82 Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act (H.R. 4995) after rejecting 
(142-263) an amendment by Mr. Addabbo to delete 
funding for B-1 production, and rejecting (99-307) 
an amendment by Mr. Murtha which would have had the 
effect of substituting the FB-111B/C for the LRCA 
program. The bill passed by the House provides about 
$12 billion less in new obligational authority than 
the bill reported by the Senate Appropriations 
Committee (S. 1857). 
11/17/81 -- The Senate Committee on Appropriations voted 21-7 
to recommend the FY82 Defense appropriations bill 
(S. 1857), containing about $2.4 billion in funding 
for the LRCA program, including about $2 billion for 
production of B-1 aircraft and over $400 million for 
research and development (S.Rept. 97-273). Unlike 
the House, the Senate Committee recommended the full 
amount requested for RDT&E (raised in October 
revisions to $471 million). In addition, the Senate 
Committee applied a 3% cost growth allowance to raise 
procurement funds slightly over requested levels. 
Consequently, the Senate version provides about $350 
million more for LRCA than the House bill (H.R. 4995). 
11/16/81 -- The House Committee on Appropriations reported the 
FY82 Defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4995), 
containing about $2.1 billion in funding for the 
LRCA program: about $1.8 billion for production 
of B-1B aircraft, and $300 million for research 
and development (H.Rept. 97-933). In a departure from 
the President's strategic program, the Appropriations 
Committee disapproved early retirement of D-model 
B-52s, and restored about $60 million for their 
continued modernization, as well as $19 million for 
operations and maintenance in FY82. Total funding 
for modernization of all B-52s was increased over the 
Administration's request by $162 million, amounting 
to about $500 million. 
11/05/81 -- A resolution disapproving the President's announced 
decision to build B-1 aircraft for the LRCA program, 
S.Res. 240, was introduced by Sen. Levin. 
10/30/81 -- The results of the conference on the FY82 Defense 
Authorization bill (S. 815) were announced by 
Senator Tower. Conferees had agreed to LRCA funding 
for FY82 in the amount of $2.1 billion, representing 
cuts of $320 million in RDT&E, initial spares, and 
procurement. According to language adopted by the 
conference, money authorized for LRCA will be 
available for obligation to the B-1 bomber 
beginning Nov. 18, 1981, unless both Houses have 
agreed to resolutions of disapproval over LRCA 
before that date. 
10/29/81 -- In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff Burke explained that the 
Air Force's official estimate of $19.7 billion for 
LRCA acquisition costs did not include full cruise 
missile integration. The Administration's decision to 
provide from the outset for internal and external 
cruise missile carriage (and to include a new 
new radio system) resulted in the revised estimate of 
$20.5 billion (FY81 dollars) or $22 billion (FY82 dollars), 
according to General Burke. 
-- The Washington Post reported findings of a draft GAO 
report that false economies may have been made to 
substantiate initially low estimates of LRCA 
acquisition costs. The Post article reports that 
expenses added later could include $220 million for 
a second inertial navigation system, $50 million 
for a Classified "nuclear feature," presumed to be a 
safety device for disarming weapons, and $65 million 
to match planned avionics systems with new Air Force 
specifications. The draft GAO report, not yet 
circulated to DOD for comments as customary, maintains 
that "questionable reductionsn were made to lower the 
basic cost goal from $22 billion (in FY81 dollars). 
10/28/81 -- By a vote of 7 to 5, the Defense Subcommittee of the 
House Committee on Appropriations agreed to recommend 
appropriations in FY82 for the LRCA program as requested 
by the Administration. The Defense Authorization Bill, 
as passed by the two Houses, was still being considered 
in conference as of this date, with some differences over 
strategic programs reported. 
10/26/81 -- As the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense 
began its consideration of the FY82 Defense Appropriations 
Bill, Subcommittee Chairman Addabbo proposed elimination 
of the B-1 program as part of an $11.2 billion reduction 
from spending levels requested by the Administration. 
10/16/81 -- The Air Force announced, without further comment, that 
Northrop has been selected as the prime contractor "to 
proceed with initial research and development on 
advanced bomber concepts." 
10/12/81 -- Aviation Week & Space Technology magazine reported that 
a Stealth bomber, as developed by Northrop, is 
scheduled to fly for the first time in late 1984. 
The advanced technology bomber program will cost 
$21.9 billion, according to this report. 
10/02/81 -- As part of a 5-point program to revitalize U.S. 
strategic deterrent posture, President Reagan announced 
his decision to build 100 long-range combat aircraft 
(LRCA), based on the B-1 bomber, while continuing 
the planned deployment of air-launched cruise 
missiles on B-52s. President Reagan pledged 
to pursue development as well of an Advanced 
Technology Bomber (ATB) "for the 1990s." 
07/16/81 -- The House passed S. 815, the FY82 Defense Authorization 
bill, in lieu of H.R. 3519. The bill, as amended, 
incorporates the same provisions with respect to the 
funding of strategic bomber programs as reported by the 
Armed Services Committee. 
07/09/81 -- In considering the FY82 Defense Authorization bill 
(H.R. 3519), the House rejected two amendments 
that would have weakened the Armed Services Committee's 
pro-B-1 language. The first amendment, by Fowler 
(153-254), sought to remove restrictions on bomber funding 
that specify the choice of B-1s. The second amendment, 
by Harkin, would have adopted Senate language on 
congressional approval or disapproval of the President's 
choice. 
05/21/81 -- Secretary of the Air Force Orr formally recommended to 
Secretary of Defense Weinberger the procurement of 100 
B-1 variants (estimated at $19.7 billion), to be followed 
by 110 Stealth bombers (estimated at $30 billion). 
05/14/81 -- By a vote of 92 to 1, the Senate passed its 
version of the FY82 DOD Authorization Bill 
(S. 815), providing $2.4 billion for development 
and procurement of a LRCA yet to be specified. 
The measure includes the provision for 
disapproving the President's choice by a majority 
vote in both houses. 
05/06/81 -- The House Armed Services Committee approved the 
FY82 DOD Authorization Bill (H.R. 2970) after 
adopting an amendment that specifies a B-1 
derivative for LRCA development ($302 million) 
and procurement ($1.9 billion) and affirms an IOC 
not later than July 1, 1987. If the President 
declares procurement of an advanced technology 
bomber instead to be in the greater national 
interest, the obligation of funds requires 
congressional approval within 60 days of that 
recommendation. 
04/28/81 -- In approving the FY82 DOD Authorization Bill 
(s. 815), the Senate Armed Services Committee 
provided $1.9 billion for procurement and $302 
million for development of LRCA. Obligation of 
funds for procurement was made contingent upon the 
President's recommendation to Congress concerning 
the aircraft selected. In addition the bill 
provides that, if both Houses pass resolutions of 
disapproval, the obligation of funds for buying 
LRCA as recommended by the President would be 
blocked. 
04/07/81 -- The Armed Services Committees received a status 
report on selection of a new manned bomber from 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense, pending a full 
recommendation from the Secretary of Defense, 
originally due March 15. In addition to assessing 
the capabilities of the three main candidates, it 
reviews the rationale for a new bomber. AF Gen. 
Burke cited low confidence in contractorsf cost 
figures as a reason for the delay. 
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